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Chapter 9 
 
Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination 
 
Markus E. Schlosser 
 
 
 
This paper is about the causal exclusion argument against non-reductive 
physicalism.1 Many philosophers think that this argument poses a serious problem 
for non-reductive theories of the mind—some think that it is decisive against them. 
In the first part I will outline non-reductive physicalism and the exclusion 
argument. Then I will distinguish between three versions of the argument that 
address three different versions of non-reductive physicalism. According to the 
first, the relation between mental and physical events is token-identity. According 
to the second, mental events are distinct from physical events, but the latter 
metaphysically include and determine the former. And on the third version, mental 
and physical events are entirely distinct. I will argue that the causal exclusion 
argument is not decisive against non-reductive physicalism in any of the three 
versions. According to non-reductive physicalism, mental events are dependent on 
physical events. Causal exclusion and overdetermination, however, requires 
distinct and independent causes. I will argue that the burden of proof lies with the 
opponents of non-reductive physicalism, who have to explain how metaphysically 
dependent events can possibly overdetermine an effect or exclude each other from 
being causally efficacious. 
 
 
Non-Reductive Physicalism 
 
Assume that there is a true theory of the mind that employs intentional vocabulary, 
and call that theory psychology. Non-reductive physicalism is the conjunction of 
physicalism and the claim that psychology is not reducible. 
Physicalism, one may think, says that everything is physical. It is common to 
distinguish physicalism from claims such as that there are only material objects or 
that everything is composed of matter. Physicalism refers to physical things, rather 
than material ones, and it leaves it up to the physical sciences to specify what 
counts as a physical entity. Further, the view concerns not only objects and what 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank my respondent Zoe Payne, the audience of the Mind 2005 conference 
and Sarah Broadie for their helpful comments and remarks. 
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they are composed of, but also events and properties. Now, if non-reductive 
physicalism is to be a consistent position, then physicalism cannot be construed as 
the view that all objects, events and properties are physical. In order to see why, let 
us have a brief look at the notion of reduction involved. 
In the philosophy of mind it is common to talk about the reducibility of mental 
types, properties or kinds. However, it is also common to point out that reduction is 
an issue that concerns theories and their explanatory power or autonomy. How do 
these claims hang together? On the standard model of scientific reduction, whether 
a theory T is reducible to the theory T* depends on whether the properties that T 
ranges over can be identified with some of the properties T* ranges over. That is, T 
is reducible to T* if and only if T-types are identical with T*-types. On that view, 
psychology is reducible to some non-mental theory T* if and only if mental types 
are identical with (non-mental) T*-types. That claim, however, has been contested 
as too strong. Some philosophers think that type-identity is not necessary for 
reduction, since weaker bridge-laws—laws that do not claim type-identities—are 
sufficient. What is uncontested, though, is that if psychology is not reducible, then 
mental kinds cannot be identified with non-mental kinds. 
So, according to non-reductive positions, there are mental properties that are 
not identical with physical properties. Hence, non-reductive theories are 
incompatible with a view that says that all properties are physical. If it is to be 
compatible with non-reductionism, physicalism must be specified accordingly. A 
common suggestion goes along the following lines. Physicalism says, firstly, that 
all concrete objects are composed of, or constituted by, physical entities, and, 
secondly, that all properties and events are dependent on physical properties and 
physical events.2 Physicalism says, in other words, that physical particulars and 
properties are the basic or fundamental particulars and properties.3 
                                                 
2  Compare, for instance, Beckermann, 1992, pp. 1-2, and Crane, 1995, pp. 211-212. Note 
that the notion of asymmetric dependence is itself in need of explanation. Some have 
therefore suggested construing the relation in terms of composition or constitution only. 
The problem with that strategy is that it is difficult to see how it can be applied to objects 
as well as events and properties (Compare Crane, p. 212). Others have suggested an 
account of the dependence involved in terms of realisation of mental properties by 
physical properties (Compare Kim, 2000, pp. 19-24). 
3  That is the standard account of non-reductive physicalism, which faces the problem of 
causal exclusion. There is, however, an alternative construal that might avoid the 
exclusion problem altogether. Arguably, we can distinguish between two different 
conceptions of reduction. On the first, reduction is an ontological issue insofar as it 
concerns the relation between mental and physical properties. On the second conception, 
reduction concerns the relation between theories (their vocabularies and explanatory 
powers). Non-reductive physicalism is clearly committed to non-reductionism in the 
second sense. It is not clear, though, whether it is also committed to ontological 
reductionism. If it is not, then it is not committed to the claim that there are irreducible 
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The Causal Exclusion Argument 
 
The so-called causal exclusion argument has been formulated in different ways. A 
first difference concerns the kinds of entities that are said to exclude each other. On 
some formulations the exclusion concerns mental and physical properties, others 
talk about mental and physical events, and some formulate the argument simply in 
terms of mental and physical causes and effects.4 A second relevant difference 
concerns the mode of causal exclusion. Some philosophers insist that what is at 
stake is the causal efficacy of mental events or properties. Others, however, say that 
the efficacy of physical events excludes the causal relevance of mental events or 
properties. 
What is common and central to all formulations of the argument, though, is the 
following intuition concerning causal exclusion and causal overdetermination. 
Suppose that c is sufficient to cause the occurrence of e, and that e has another 
cause c*, which is distinct from and not part of c. Let us say that an event e1 is a 
sufficient cause of the event e2, if e1’s occurrence is, in the circumstances, 
sufficient for the occurrence of e2. And e1 is a partial cause of e2, if e1 is a cause of 
e2 in the sense that e1 is itself not sufficient for the occurrence of e2, but it is part of 
a complex event, which is sufficient for the occurrence of e2. Now, c*, the 
additional cause of e, is either a sufficient or a partial cause of e. If c* is sufficient, 
then c and c* exclude each other from being the cause of e, because they 
overdetermine its occurrence. If c* is a partial cause of e, then c excludes c* from 
being causally efficacious, since c is already causally sufficient for the occurrence 
of e. (I will call causes that exclude each other or overdetermine their effects in that 
sense, rival causes). 
These intuitions concerning exclusion and overdetermination are considerably 
strong and straightforward only insofar as they are formulated in terms of causes 
and effects. Our intuitions are far less straightforward with respect to causally 
relevant properties. It is not obvious whether instantiations of properties can 
exclude each other, or overdetermine effects, in the same way as causes. To assume 
                                                                                                                 
mental properties. I can agree that reduction is, first and foremost, a relation between 
theories. The question, however, whether the reduction of a theory presupposes 
ontological reduction is beyond the scope of this paper. I will assume, throughout, that the 
standard construal of non-reductive physicalism is correct. 
4  Formulations in terms of causes and effects can be found, for instance, in Lowe, 2003, and 
Merricks, 2001. For formulations in terms of instantiations of properties compare Kim, 
1993 and 2000, Crane, 1995 and Menzies, 2003. Kim and Yablo, 1992, think that it is of 
no significance whether the argument is put in terms of causes, events or property 
instantiations. 
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that they can is a substantial—and controversial—additional assumption. That is 
why I introduce the causal exclusion argument purely in extensional terms: 
formulated in terms of causes and effects only. The three basic assumptions behind 
the argument are the following. 
 
(1) Mental Causation: Mental phenomena cause physical phenomena. 
(2) Causal Closure of the Physical: Every physical effect has a causally sufficient 
physical cause.5 
(3) Exclusion of Causal Overdetermination: Causal effects are, usually, not 
causally overdetermined. 
 
The causal exclusion argument goes as follows. Every version of physicalism is 
committed to the three claims just presented. A non-reductive version of 
physicalism, however, is incompatible with the conjunction of them. Given that 
only events can be causes, (1) says that some mental events have physical effects. 
Assume that the mental event m is a cause of the physical event p; m is either a 
partial or a sufficient cause of p. Applying (3), we exclude that m overdetermines 
the occurrence of p (we assume that p has only one sufficient cause, if it has a 
sufficient cause). So, if p has a sufficient cause, c, then m either is c, or m is not a 
sufficient cause of p. According to (2), p has a sufficient physical cause. Hence, c 
is a sufficient physical cause of p. Given that, m cannot be a sufficient cause, but it 
must be a partial cause of p. Partial causes are parts of sufficient causes. Since c is 
the only sufficient cause of p, m must be part of c. But since c is a physical—that 
is, non-mental—cause, m must be a physical cause of p, contrary to the assumption 
that m is a mental cause of p. The argument shows that the assumptions (2) and (3) 
exclude the causal efficacy of mental events, contrary to (1). 
The exclusion argument is generally considered to be a very powerful argument 
that constitutes a serious problem for non-reductive physicalism.6 It is 
                                                 
5  Generally, by causally sufficient I mean sufficient either for the occurrence of the effect or 
sufficient to determine its chance. In this paper, though, I have to restrict my 
considerations to the deterministic case. So, in what follows causally sufficient will mean 
sufficient for the occurrence of the effect. 
6  A well-known response on behalf of non-reductive physicalism is a reductio ad absurdum 
to the conclusion that there must be something wrong the argument. There is no obvious 
reason to deny that the argument applies to the special sciences in general. If the argument 
can be generalised, it entails that, for instance, the efficacy of chemical, physiological and 
biological events is excluded by the efficacy of physical events—which is absurd. 
Proponents of the exclusion argument dismiss this reductio as evasive. What is required, 
they insist, is a metaphysical solution to the problem of mental causation. Or, at the very 
least, non-reductive physicalists must be able to spell out what is wrong with the 
argument. Compare Kim, 2000, and Crane, 1995. 
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acknowledged that there are different versions of non-reductive physicalism that 
require different versions of the argument. But it is usually thought that differences 
with respect to the details do not diminish the main thrust of the argument. In the 
following I will have a closer look at three different versions of the argument. I 
will to show that the differences between them are significant, and I will argue that 
the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against any version of non-reductive 
physicalism. 
 
 
Events and Property Instantiations 
 
I assumed that the relevant mental phenomena are mental events. Philosophers of 
mind, though, often talk about mental states and properties. It is common to use 
the term mental events in a broad sense that includes mental states.7 We would, 
then, obtain two versions of the argument; one in terms of mental events, and the 
other one in terms of the instantiations of mental properties (for no one should 
expect the properties themselves to have a causal role). Little significance has been 
given to this distinction. It has been assumed that the argument is equally 
compelling in both versions. Let us first consider the version in terms of mental 
events. 
The causal exclusion problem would dissolve under the assumption that mental 
kinds are identical with physical kinds. But this solution is obviously not an option 
for non-reductive physicalism, which is committed to the rejection of type-
identities. Another possibility, though, is identity between mental and physical 
event-tokens. 
There are two ways to distinguish events as mental events. An event is a mental 
event just in case it has a mental description, or, alternatively, just in case it has a 
mental property. I shall assume that the two definitions are equivalent. Given that, 
it is certainly possible that mental events are identical with physical events, even 
though mental properties cannot be identified with physical properties. For it is 
possible that one and the same event has both a mental and a physical description 
(or property).8 Further, it is possible that the physical properties of such an event 
include those properties that realise and determine the event’s mental properties. 
That is, it is possible that it is one and the same event that has both the mental 
properties and the physical properties on which they depends. Suppose that this is 
                                                 
7  Compare for instance Horgan and Tye, 1988, who say that they are following a “frequent 
recent practice” by using “event” in a sense that includes “states, process, and the like” (p. 
427). 
8  Davidson has famously argued that this not only possible, but actually the case: every 
event that has a mental description has a physical description. See Davidson 1980, essays 
11 and 12. 
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generally the case. Then the non-reductive physicalist can say that the mental and 
physical events are not rival causes, because they are one and the same event—
being token identical, they share causal powers. 
If we consider property instantiations instead of events, that move—the appeal 
to token-identity—is not available. For what goes hand and hand with that 
alternative version is a particular view on the nature and individuation of events, 
according to which events are property instantiations. On that view, events are 
properties instantiated by a substance at a time. That rules token-identity out, since 
the instantiation of a mental property and the instantiation of the underlying 
physical property constitute distinct event-tokens. 
It seems that we have identified a significant difference between the two 
versions of the exclusion argument. But it merely seems so, the opponents insist. 
According to Davidson’s theory, which is the token-identity theory, the events in 
question instantiate a causal law only under their physical description. We are 
warranted in regarding them as cause and effect only insofar as they are covered by 
physical law. But that means that they are causally efficacious only in virtue of 
their physical properties; they cause what they cause not in virtue of being mental 
events. Therefore, appeal to token-identity does not help, and the difference 
between the two versions is of no significance. Consider, for instance, how Stephen 
Yablo has put that point. 
 
To reply with the majority that mental events just are certain physical events, whose 
causal powers they therefore share, only relocates the problem from the particulars 
to their universal features […]. Mental events are effective, maybe, but not by way 
of their mental properties; any causal role that the latter might have hoped to play is 
occupied already by their physical rivals.9 
 
A few things, however, have been overlooked in this diagnosis. In my alternative 
analysis I will distinguish between three versions of the argument, whereby each 
version results from a combination of non-reductive physicalism with a particular 
view on the individuation of events. 
 
 
Version One 
 
The first version of the argument is directed at the already mentioned token-
identity theory. On that view, the mental events and the underlying physical events, 
which realise and determine the mental events, are token-identical. The charge 
against this view is that such events cause their effects only in virtue of their 
                                                 
9 Yablo, 1992, pp. 248-249. 
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physical properties – the events in question have physical effects, but not in virtue 
of being mental events. 
Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that events cause their effects in 
virtue of some of their properties.10 Why do the events in question have their 
effects not in virtue of their mental properties? How can the opponent justify the 
claim that they are efficacious only in virtue of their physical properties? We can 
distinguish between two arguments for that claim. 
The first argument appeals to a connection between the causal role of properties 
and causal laws. It is assumed, firstly, that an event c causes the occurrence of the 
event e in virtue of having the property P if and only if P figures in the causal law 
that covers e and c (more precisely, if and only if there is a causal law according to 
which an event’s being P is nomologically sufficient or relevant for the occurrence 
of e). Further, if c causes e in virtue of having P, P is said to be a causally relevant 
property with respect to e’s causing c. And it is assumed, secondly, that there are 
no psychological laws or regularities that ground causal claims about mental 
events; it is assumed, in other words, that psychological anomalism is true. From 
that it follows that no event causes an effect in virtue of having a mental property. 
That first argument, however, is not decisive for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the second assumption—psychological anomalism—is rather controversial. It is in 
need of independent justification and cannot just be assumed. The problem is that 
most philosophers who deploy the exclusion argument against non-reductive 
physicalism also argue for some form of reductive physicalism.11 But it is hard to 
see what independent reasons a reductive physicalist might have to hold the second 
assumption. In fact, reductive physicalism seems to be committed to the claim that 
there are psychological laws or regularities that ground causal claims about 
intentional states and events. Secondly, the argument shifts the focus of the debate 
in a way that is problematic for the opponent of non-reductive physicalism. 
Typically, opponents of non-reductive physicalism argue that the problem of 
mental causation requires a metaphysical solution, and that all proposals that 
establish merely the explanatory relevance of mental events or properties are 
inadequate or beside the point. The problem, they insist, concerns causal efficacy, 
                                                 
10 Davidson’s own response is that, given his view on causation and the individuation of 
events, it simply does not make any sense to say that a cause is efficacious in virtue of 
some of its properties. Causation is an extensional relation between events. Surely, in 
order to obtain a causal explanation we have to refer to the events using the right 
descriptions. But it does not follow that they are efficacious in virtue of some property 
(Compare Davidson, 1993, especially pp. 12-13). Opponents will either insist on the 
principle that causes are efficacious in virtue of some of their properties, or they will try to 
show that Davidson’s response merely relocates the problem in a way that does not help to 
save the view. My task, however, is not to decide on the tenability of Davidson’s response. 
11 The most prominent proponent of that strategy is Kim, 1997 and 2000. 
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not causal explanatory relevance. The argument, though, shifts the focus from the 
causal efficacy of mental events to the question whether mental properties figure in 
causal laws and the question whether there are psychological laws; questions which 
concern the explanatory relevance of the mental, rather than their causal efficacy.12 
According to a second line of argument, it becomes obvious that the events in 
question have their effects only in virtue of their physical properties once the 
principle of the causal closure of the physical is understood in the right way. 
According to Kim, the basic idea behind that principle is that, for every physical 
event, one will never “leave the physical domain”, if one traces out its complete 
causal history.13 The causal history of any physical event consists only of other 
physical events. Events are physical events in virtue of having physical properties. 
So, the causal history of any physical event can be given in terms of other events 
and their physical properties only. And that means, it seems obvious, that all the 
causal relations that constitute that history hold only in virtue of physical 
properties; there is no room left for mental properties to do any additional causal 
work. 
The closure principle, however, is a purely metaphysical and extensional 
principle; it talks about causes and effects only. Assume, once more, that events 
and only events can be causes and effects. Consider a physical event e that is 
caused by c, and assume that e is both a physical event in virtue of having the 
physical property P and a mental event in virtue of having the mental property M. 
What licences the claim that c causes e only in virtue of having P? 
I fail to see why and how the closure principle, by itself, rules out the 
possibility that c causes e in virtue of having M. Note, firstly, that in order to hold 
that c causes e in virtue of having M one does not have to “leave” the physical 
domain. Metaphysically speaking, we cannot leave the physical domain, since each 
mental event is, by assumption, identical with a physical event. Secondly, the 
thought behind the argument cannot be that the causal relevance of mental 
properties is excluded by the causal relevance of physical properties. Without the 
introduction and justification of further metaphysical principles, the notion of 
exclusion—just as the notion of overdetermination—applies only to causes (that is, 
events).14 The closure principle does not entail anything with respect to the causal 
                                                 
12 Further below I will say more about causal efficacy and causally relevant properties. 
Compare also note 14. 
13 Compare Kim, 2000, p. 40: “One way of stating the principle of physical causal closure is 
this: If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will 
never take you outside the physical domain.” 
14 Stephen Yablo says that although “causes and effects are events, properties as well as 
events can be causally relevant or sufficient” (Yablo, 1992, p. 247, note 5). It is correct 
that we can talk about causally relevant events as well as causally relevant properties. But 
is not obvious that the sense of causal relevance is the same in both cases. An event can be 
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relevance of properties. It does not exclude the relevance of mental properties, 
since it does not say that physical properties are sufficient—whatever that might 
mean. It says that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. But it is an 
event that is sufficient, not an event’s having a certain property rather than 
another.15 
 
In conclusion we can say the causal exclusion argument is not decisive against the 
token-identity version of non-reductive physicalism. Opponents, however, will 
object that even if the response is correct, it shows only that it is possible that some 
events have their effects in virtue of their mental properties—it shows only that 
mental properties can be causally relevant. What needs to be shown, though, is that 
the mental is causally efficacious. 
What kinds of things can be causally efficacious? Causes, I suggest, and only 
causes are causally efficacious. And as the standard view has it, events and only 
events are causes. Instantiations of properties, on the other hand, can have two 
different causal roles. Firstly, as being the property of an event—as being 
instantiated by an event—a property can be causally relevant in the sense the event 
causes the effect in virtue of having the property. Secondly, as being an event the 
instantiation of a property—by a substance, at a time—can be causally efficacious. 
On the present version of the argument, mental event tokens are physical event 
tokens. That is, the instantiation of the mental property and the instantiation of the 
physical property do not constitute two distinct events, since they are instantiated 
by one and the same event. Given the distinctions just made, it follows that 
instantiations of mental properties can at best be causally relevant—they are not 
and cannot be causes. And that means that they cannot be causally efficacious. 
Further, instantiations of physical and mental properties cannot be causal rivals, 
since causal exclusion or overdetermination presupposes distinct causes. Now, 
                                                                                                                 
causally relevant in the extensional sense of being a partial cause. In that sense, events are 
causally relevant as causes. If one denies, as Yablo does, that properties can themselves be 
causes, it remains to be explained in what sense properties can be causally relevant. And 
whatever that sense is, it is different from the one in which events are relevant, and it is, 
therefore, not clear at all that the exclusion argument can be restated simply by 
substituting property for event, as Yablo suggests. 
15 Some may construe the closure principle as saying that the occurrence of any physical 
event can be explained in physical terms only (only in terms of events and their physical 
properties). But by reading the argument in that way, the opponent is again shifting the 
focus from causation to causal explanation. The closure principle is a metaphysical 
principle. It is about causes, not about causal explanations. It does not say that physical 
causes have their effect only in virtue of their physical causes, nor does it say that 
everything can be causally explained in terms of physical properties. 
148 Chapter Nine 
what does not follow from all that is that mental events are not, or cannot be, 
causally efficacious. 
 
 
Version Two 
 
One the first version, mental and physical properties are properties of one and the 
same event. If we construe events as property instantiations, we obtain two further 
versions of the argument. On both versions, the properties are partly constitutive of 
events, rather than being instantiated by events. Kim, for instance, says that “the 
properties an event exemplifies must be sharply distinguished from its constitutive 
property (which is exemplified, not by the event, but by the constitutive substance 
of the event).”16 According to that, properties can be related to events in at least 
two different ways. Either the property is instantiated by the event, or its 
instantiation by a substance at a time constitutes the event. In the former case the 
property modifies the event, in latter case it modifies the involved substance. 
In some cases, however, it will be controversial whether a given property is 
constitutive of an event or not. In an example Kim compares the event Sebastian’s 
stroll with Sebastian’s leisurely strolling. Are there two events happening at the 
same time, or is there only one event has that more than one true description? On 
what is known as the Anscombe-Davidson view on the individuation of events, 
there is only one event that can correctly be described as a stroll and as a leisurely 
stroll. 
According to the view that events are property instantiations, however, whether 
there is only one event depends on whether strolling and strolling leisurely are 
constitutive properties. Further, if two properties constitute events, we must 
distinguish between two ways in which the events are related. For two events can 
be distinct, without being entirely distinct, as Kim says.17 Sebastian’s stroll and 
Sebastian’s leisurely stroll, for instance, are distinct events. But not entirely 
distinct, since the latter event metaphysically includes the former. 
 
Given that, we can now formulate the second version of non-reductive physicalism, 
according to which the instantiation of mental and physical properties constitute 
events that are distinct, but not entirely. Rather, physical events include mental 
events. 
Kim did not try to spell out how the relation of inclusion between distinct 
events has to be understood; he says that the notion is intuitively plausible 
                                                 
16 Kim, 1993, p. 43 
17 The distinction between distinct and entirely distinct events is supposed to block a 
counterintuitive proliferation of events. Compare ibid, pp. 42-46. 
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enough.18 Stephen Yablo, though, has suggested the following. According to 
Yablo, the relation between mental and physical events is best understood as one 
between determinables and determinates, which, in turn, is best understood as an 
event’s essence subsuming the other event’s essence. What does that mean? 
Consider the determinate being red of the determinable being coloured. Being red 
is a specific—or determinate—way of being coloured. Similarly, Sebastian’s 
leisurely strolling is a determinate of Sebastian’s stroll, and the former subsumes 
the latter. The important thing to note is that the relation of subsumption—of one 
event’s subsuming another event—is precisely the relation of inclusion. I will not 
go into any further detail of Yablo’s account.19 Rather, let us see how it can be 
applied to the problem of mental causation. 
The lesson to be learned, according to Yablo, is that mental and physical events 
cannot causally exclude each other, if they stand in the suggested metaphysical 
relation of inclusion.20 For we know, as Yablo says, that determinates and 
determinables are not causal rivals. Surely, by citing an object’s being red we may 
be able to causally explain an event, or an event’s having a certain property, which 
cannot be explained by referring to that object’s being coloured. But it cannot 
plausibly be suggested that these properties are rival causes, simply because the 
particular instance of being red just is the particular instance of being coloured. If 
we apply this lesson to the problem of mental causation, we can then say with 
Yablo that “any credible reconstruction of the [problem] must respect the truism 
that determinates do not contend with their determinables for causal influence.”21 
It does not matter whether or not Yablo was successful in analysing the relation 
of metaphysical inclusion correctly. For, on any account of that relation, if the 
physical event determines the mental event by including it, the two events cannot 
plausibly be causal rivals. To say they cannot be causal rivals is to say that they can 
neither exclude each other, nor overdetermine an effect, and we can conclude that 
                                                 
18 Ibid, p. 45 
19 As indicated, Yablo suggests to construe the relation of inclusion as a relation between the 
event’s essences: an event e is said to subsume or include another event e*, if the essence 
of e* is a subset of the essence of e. Compare Yablo, 1992, section 5, especially pp. 261-
262. 
20 One may wonder how a physical event can include a mental event. The best way to think 
about it is in terms of multiple realisation. Assume that systems of type S and type T can 
be in mental states of type M, and that systems of the two types realise M in different 
ways. Then the states that realise M in systems of type S and T must be alike in certain 
respects, because they both realise M. But given that M is multiply realisable, we can 
assume that those states also differ in some respects; they realise M in different ways. 
Given that, we can say that the way in which the two systems realise M are specific or 
determinate ways of being in M. 
21 Ibid, p. 259 
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the causal exclusion argument does not apply to the second version of non-
reductive physicalism. 
 
 
Version three 
 
On the third version of the argument, instantiations of the mental and the physical 
properties constitute entirely distinct events. None of the responses that have been 
given so far apply. The mental and physical properties in question are constitutive 
of metaphysically distinct events. Instantiations of them can therefore be 
efficacious as causes. Furthermore, it seems that they can be causal rivals, since 
they constitute entirely distinct events.22 
Yablo argued that, if two events are not entirely distinct, in the sense that one 
includes the other, then they cannot be causal rivals. It does not follow that two 
events can be causal rivals, if they are entirely distinct. Nor is it obvious that all 
causes that are entirely distinct causes of one and the same effect are, or can be, 
rival causes. In order decide whether they are or can be rival causes, we need to 
have a closer look at some of the issues involved. 
Intuitively, for causal rivalry, exclusion or overdetermination to occur, there 
have to be two or more independent causes of one and the same effect. If that is not 
the case, if the causes in question are not independent in the relevant sense, the 
exclusion argument does not apply, because the notions of causal rivalry, exclusion 
and overdetermination do not apply. In other words, whatever is necessary for 
causal rivalry, exclusion and overdetermination, is necessary for an application of 
the argument. 
In the following I will suggest a characterisation of causal overdetermination 
and of the involved notion of independence. I will argue that mental and physical 
                                                 
22 Non-reductive physicalists may argue that this way of construing the relation between 
mental and physical events is not compatible with non-reductive physicalism. According 
to non-reductive physicalism, mental events depend on physical events. This dependence, 
one may think, is incompatible with the claim that the events are entirely distinct. But is it 
impossible that two events are entirely distinct and dependent? Consider the following. 
Brutus killed Caesar by stabbing him with a knife. At one point, Kim suggests that both 
Brutus’ killing Caesar and Brutus’ stabbing Caesar are generic—hence, entirely 
distinct—events, whereas Brutus’ stabbing Caesar with a knife merely modifies Brutus’ 
stabbing Caesar (compare Kim, 1993, p. 44). Intuitively, though, there is a sense in which 
the particular killing of Caesar depends on Brutus’ stabbing him. To decide whether the 
third version is consistent would require a detailed discussion of the involved notions of 
metaphysical distinctness and dependence, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Rather, I will assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is consistent. If it is not 
consistent, so much the worse for the proponents of the exclusion argument—for then the 
third version collapses into either version one or two. 
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events, construed as entirely distinct events, cannot overdetermine their effects, 
because they are not independent in the required sense. Given that, it is then the 
opponent’s burden to clarify why and how the exclusion argument applies to non-
reductive physicalism and to the problem of mental causation in general. Let me 
begin with two observations. 
Let us consider a clear case of causal exclusion; a case in which two causes 
overdetermine an effect. An example that is often used to illustrate causal 
overdetermination is the case in which two sharpshooters kill their victim, which 
happens to be one and the same person, at exactly the same time. Each shot is 
sufficient to cause the victim’s death, which is overdetermined by two distinct 
sufficient and independent causes. 
The first observation is that the events in the case of mental causation are not 
distinct in the same way as the relevant events in the sharpshooter case. In the 
sharpshooter case, the events are not only distinct with respect to the instantiation 
of properties, but they are distinct in the further sense that the properties are 
instantiated by distinct substances. This, of course, is not the case for mental 
causation; the mental and the physical property are instantiated by one and the 
same substance. That does not show, of course, that being instantiated by distinct 
substances is necessary or sufficient for causal rivalry. But it suggests that the 
event’s being entirely distinct is not sufficient. What is required, in addition, is that 
they are independent, in some sense. 
This brings us to the second observation. What we are assuming, and what the 
opponents of non-reductive physicalism usually assume as well, is that the two 
purported causes - the mental and the physical event – stand in some intimate 
relationship. All versions of non-reductive physicalism assume that mental events 
supervene, in some sense, on physical events, and that mental events are realised 
by them. It is assumed, in other words, that mental events (or properties) are, in 
some sense, dependent on physical events (or properties). By hypothesis, that is, the 
mental and their underlying physical events (or properties) are not independent. 
This independence, however, concerns the existence of mental events and 
properties. Whenever there is a mental event, there is some physical event that 
realises it. It is possible that there are physical events and no mental events, but it is 
impossible that there are mental events and no physical events. The mental depends 
on the physical and is realised by it, but not vice versa. 
What we are interested in, however, is independence of causes as a criterion for 
the application of the causal exclusion argument. Recall that the third assumption 
of the causal exclusion argument concerns causal overdetermination. The argument 
applies only if the notion of causal overdetermination applies. That is, for the 
argument to apply, there must be causes that can overdetermine an effect. 
I suggest having a closer look at the notion of causal overdetermination in order 
to get better a grasp of the relevant notion of independence. Let us begin with a 
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characterisation of overdetermination, which is adopted from Trenton Merrick’s 
Objects and Persons.23 
 
Some effect e is causally overdetermined if: 
(a) e is caused by c, 
(b) c is causally irrelevant as to whether some other numerically distinct cause, c*, 
is a cause of e, 
(c) e is caused by c*, and c* is numerically distinct from c. 
 
Whereby c is causally irrelevant as to whether c* is a cause of e if:24 
(d) c is not a cause of c* (that is, c is neither a sufficient nor a partial cause of c*, 
and c is not an intermediate in a causal chain that runs from a cause of c* to 
c*), or 
(e) c does not cause c* to cause e (nor does it cause any members of c* to cause e, 
if c* consists of more than one cause jointly causing e). 
 
One can agree with Merricks that this extensional construal of overdetermination is 
straightforward. But, unfortunately, it does not help us any further for two reasons. 
Firstly, Merricks talks about objects as being causes.25 For overdetermination to 
occur, two distinct causes have to cause the effect, and distinct causes are, on that 
view, distinct objects. That means that rival causes—causes that can overdetermine 
an effect—are numerically distinct substances. That reflects my intuition that we 
get a clear sense of the phenomenon of overdetermination, if the causes are 
associated with distinct substances. But since it does not cover the case in which 
two distinct events occurring in one and the same substance, it is of no help. 
Secondly, the definition recognises only causal relations between the two 
potentially rival causes; what matters, according to clause (b), is whether one cause 
is causally relevant or irrelevant as to whether the other cause brings about the 
effect. What we are looking for is a characterisation of the way in which the two 
causes of the effect, c and c*, can said to be dependent or independent causes. The 
presented definition captures the dependence between them in terms of causal 
relevance; that is, the dependence is construed as causal dependence. 
Some philosophers have tried to understand the relation between mental states 
and their physical realisations in causal terms. Most philosophers, however, think 
                                                 
23 Compare Merricks, 2001, p. 58, who thinks that a definition along such lines is ‘the most 
literal, straightforward and natural’ definition of causal overdetermination. 
24 Compare ibid, p. 57. Note that the involved notion of causal relevance is different from the 
notion of causal relevance as it applies to properties. Compare also note 14. 
25 It is not obvious whether the view is committed to substance-causation. One might hold, 
for instance, that causation by objects is causation by change in objects or by the object’s 
having of a certain property. 
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that the dependence between the mental and the physical is of a different kind. The 
notion of supervenience, as many think, provides merely a minimal constraint for 
that relation, which is itself in need of explanation (given that it holds). A popular 
solution is to say that supervenience holds, because the physical states realise the 
mental states.26 What is needed, then, are dependence-conditions that can be 
applied to different relations between the physical and the mental, such as 
causation, supervenience, determination and realisation. An obvious candidate for 
that is counterfactual dependence. 
It is commonly assumed that there is a close connection between causal 
dependence and counterfactual dependence. Causal relations are said to entail or 
support relations of counterfactual dependence. On Merricks’ definition, c and c* 
do not overdetermine e, if c is causally relevant as to whether c* causes e. If c is 
causally relevant in that way, then whether c* causes e depends causally on c. This 
causal dependence entails or supports counterfactuals of the following form: 
 
 (CF) Given relevantly similar circumstances, had c not occurred, c* would not 
have caused e. 
 
My suggestion is to replace the causal dependence employed in Merrick’s 
definition by counterfactual dependence. For what is crucial, it seems, is not the 
causal connection itself, but the entailed counterfactual. Consider again the case of 
the two sharpshooters. It is a case of overdetermination, because there are two 
sufficient and independent causes of the same effect. Specified in causal terms, the 
independence consists in the absence of causal connections between the two 
causes. Why is that relevant to question whether the effect is overdetermined? If 
one shooting depends causally on the other shooting, as one might say, then the 
two shootings are not independent causes of the victim’s death. But that is plainly 
circular, given that we want know in virtue of what causes are independent causes. 
A better answer is the following. If the two shootings are causally dependent, then 
one of the two sharpshooters would not have killed the victim, had the other one 
not done so. 
The case of the two sharpshooters is a case in which it is a coincidence that two 
causes are sufficient to cause the same effect. A causal connection would render 
the two shootings non-coincidental. But so would a counterfactual connection. 
That is why I suggest replacing the causal condition on overdetermination by a 
counterfactual one. Accordingly, the two causes, c and c*, do not overdetermine 
the effect e, if c*’s causing e is counterfactually dependent on c; that is, if CF 
holds. 
 
                                                 
26 Compare Kim, 2000, pp. 23-24. 
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We found Merrick’s definition of causal overdetermination to be too narrow, since 
it covers only cases in which two potentially rival causes are causally dependent. 
To construe the kind of dependence that is necessary for causal rivalry and 
overdetermination in terms of counterfactual dependence has the advantage that it 
covers causal as well as other relationships that might hold between events. In 
order to see whether the counterfactual approach will get us any further with our 
problem, let us see whether the relation of realisation—as it is usually employed by 
non-reductive theories—supports counterfactuals of the right sort. 
Suppose that p is the physical realisation of the mental event m, and that both p 
and m are causes of the event e. Is it true that had p not occurred, m would not have 
caused e? Let us assume that m is multiply realisable.27 We have then to distinguish 
between two cases. In the first case we assume that each system—or agent—falls 
under a certain type—or species—such that for all mental event-tokens m of type 
M: for any agent of a certain type, tokens of M are realised by physical event-
tokens p of type P. In that case, we can limit our considerations to agents of certain 
types, and restricted counterfactuals of following form will hold. 
 
(CF’) For all agents s of type S: had the s-involving event p not occurred, the s-
involving event m would not have caused e, given relevantly similar 
circumstances. 
 
That counterfactual holds, because the occurrence of m depends counterfactually 
on p. If the antecedent holds, then the mental event m does not occur—and if m 
does not occur, then, trivially, m does not cause e. 
In the second case, we do not assume that mental events of a certain type are 
realised by all agents of a certain type in the same way—realised by physical 
events of the same type. In that case we have to consider the set {P1, P2, P3…} of 
all possible realisations of the mental state type—across all individuals of all agent-
types. In that case, counterfactuals of the following form will hold. 
 
(CF’’) For any agent s: had none of the s-involving events pi (of type Pi) occurred, 
the s-involving event m would not have caused e, given relevantly similar 
circumstances. 
 
Again, that counterfactual holds, because the occurrence of m depends 
counterfactually on pi. If the antecedent holds, then the mental event m does not 
                                                 
27 Note that non-reductive physicalism is typically motivated by the possibility of multiple 
realisation of mental states. It is therefore safe to make that assumption. (Moreover, if 
relevant counterfactuals hold in case mental states are multiply realisable, they certainly 
hold in case they are not.) 
 Causal Exclusion and Overdetermination 155 
occur—and if m does not occur, then, trivially, m does not cause e. What we get, in 
both cases, is a counterfactual dependence between p, m, and m’s causing e. 
Given all that, we can conclude that mental events and their physical 
realisations do not overdetermine their effects since they are not independent 
causes. The mental event is not an independent cause, because its occurrence and 
its causing the effect depends counterfactually on its physical realisation. No 
dependency of that sort holds for standard examples of causal overdetermination. 
The two shootings do not depend on each other—neither causally nor 
counterfactually. What makes the sharpshooter case a case of causal 
overdetermination is precisely the fact that had one sharpshooter not killed the 
victim, the other one would have. They kill their victim independently of each 
other—and that they do so at the same time, with the same success, is a mere 
coincidence. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I argued that the causal exclusion is not decisive against non-reductive 
physicalism, no matter whether the mental and physical events in question are 
construed as token-identical, distinct or entirely distinct. What is important to note 
is that the response to the last version applies to all three versions, since it relies on 
the claim that mental events are dependent on physical events—a claim that all 
versions of non-reductive physicalism are committed to. 
What causal exclusion and rivalry amount to is fairly straightforward in case 
there are distinct and independent causes. But the case of mental causation is not of 
that sort. It is not clear at all what causal exclusion and rivalry amount to, given 
that the mental depends on the physical. There would have to be a kind of causal 
exclusion that is either not tied to the outlined notion of overdetermination, or one 
that is not tied to any notion of overdetermination at all. In any case, it remains to 
be shown what sort of causal exclusion that is and how it has to be understood. We 
can conclude that the opponents of non-reductive physicalism have yet to show 
how the causal exclusion argument applies to mental causation, even if it is 
assumed that mental events and their physical realisations are entirely distinct. 
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